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ABSTRACT
While previous works on privacy-preserving serial data pub-
lishing consider the scenario where sensitive values may per-
sist over multiple data releases, we find that no previous work
has sufficient protection provided for sensitive values that
can change over time, which should be the more common
case. In this work, we propose to study the privacy guar-
antee for such transient sensitive values, which we call the
global guarantee. We formally define the problem for achiev-
ing this guarantee and derive some theoretical properties for
this problem. We show that the anonymized group sizes used
in the data anonymization is a key factor in protecting indi-
vidual privacy in serial publication. We propose two strate-
gies for anonymization targeting at minimizing the average
group size and the maximum group size. Finally, we conduct
experiments on a medical dataset to show that our method
is highly efficient and also produces published data of very
high utility.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been much study on the issues in
privacy-preserving data publishing [2, 13, 12, 4, 16, 27, 7,
14, 33, 9, 22, 15]. Most previous works deal with privacy
protection when only one instance of the data is published.
However, in many applications, data is published at regular
time intervals. For example, the medical data from a hospital
may be published twice a year. Some recent papers [19, 30,
8, 6, 23, 5] study the privacy protection issues for multiple
data publications of multiple instances of the data. We refer
to such data publishing serial data publishing.
Following the settings of previous works, we assume that
there is a sensitive attribute which contains sensitive values
that should not be linked to the individuals in the database.
A common example of such a sensitive attribute is diseases.
While some diseases such as flu or stomach virus may not be
very sensitive, some diseases such as chlamydia (a sex disease)
can be considered highly sensitive. In serial publishing of
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such a set of data, the disease values attached to a certain
individual can change over time.
A typical guarantee we want to achieve is that the proba-
bility that an adversary can derive for the linkage of a person
to a sensitive value is no more than 1/ℓ. This is well-known
to be a simple form of ℓ-diversity [16]. This guarantee sounds
innocent enough for a single release data publication. How-
ever, when it comes to serial data publishing, the objective
becomes quite illusive and requires a much closer look. In se-
rial publishing, the individuals that are recorded in the data
may change, and the sensitive values related to individuals
may also change. We assume that the sensitive values can
change freely.
Let us consider a sensitive disease chlamydia, which is a
sex disease that is easily curable. Suppose that there exist
3 records of an individual o in 3 different medical data re-
leases. It is obvious that typically o would not want anyone
to deduce with high confidence from these released data that
s/he has ever contracted chlamydia in the past. Here, the
past practically corresponds to one or more of the three data
releases. Therefore, if from these data releases, an adver-
sary can deduce with high confidence that o has contracted
chlamydia in one or more of the three releases, privacy would
have been breached. To protect privacy, we would like the
probability of any individual being linked to a sensitive value
in one or more data releases to be bounded from the above by
1/ℓ. Let us call this privacy guarantee the global guarantee
and the value 1/ℓ the privacy threshold.
Though the global guarantee requirement seems to be quite
obvious, to the best of our knowledge, no existing work has
considered such a guarantee. Instead, the closest guarantee of
previous works is the following: for each of the data releases, o
can be linked to chlamydia with a probability of no more than
1/ℓ. Let us call this guarantee the localized guarantee. Would
this guarantee be equivalent to the above global guarantee ?
In order to answer this question, let us look at an example.
Consider two raw medical tables (or micro data) T1 and
T2 as shown in Figure 1 at time points 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Suppose that they contain records for the individuals
o1, o2, o3, o4, o5. There are two kinds of attributes, namely
quasi-identifier (QID) attributes and sensitive attributes.
Quasi-identifier attributes are attributes that can be used to
identify an individual with the help of an external source such
as a voter registration list [21, 12, 13, 29]. In this example, sex
and zipcode are the quasi-identifier attributes, while disease
is the sensitive attribute. Attribute id is used for illustration
purpose and does not appear in the published table. We as-
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sume that each individual owns at most one tuple in each
table at each time point. Furthermore, we assume no addi-
tional background knowledge about the linkage of individuals
to diseases, and the sensitive values linked to individuals can
be freely updated from one release to the next release.
Id Sex Zip- Disease
code
o1 M 65001 flu
o2 M 65002 chlamydia
o3 F 65014 flu
o4 F 65015 fever
Id Sex Zip- Disease
code
o1 M 65001 chlamydia
o2 M 65002 flu
o3 F 65014 fever
o5 F 65010 flu
(a) T1 (b) T2
Figure 1: A motivating example
Sex Zipcode Disease
M 6500* flu
M 6500* chlamydia
F 6501* flu
F 6501* fever
Sex Zipcode Disease
M 6500* chlamydia
M 6500* flu
F 6501* fever
F 6501* flu
(a) T∗
1
(b) T∗
2
Figure 2: Anonymization for T1 and T2
Assume that the privacy threshold is 1/ℓ = 1/2. In a
typical data anonymization [21, 12, 13, 29], in order to protect
individual privacy, the QID attributes of the raw table are
generalized or bucketized in order to form some anonymized
groups (AG) to hide the linkage between an individual and
a sensitive value. For example, table T ∗1 in Figure 2(a) is a
generalized table of T1 in Figure 1. We generalize the zip
code of the first two tuples to 6500* so that they have the
same QID values in T ∗1 . We say that these two tuples form
an anonymized group. It is easy to see that in each published
table T ∗1 or T
∗
2 , the probability of linking any individual to
chlamydia or flu is at most 1/2, which satisfies the localized
guarantee. The question is whether this satisfies the global
privacy guarantee with a threshold of 1/2.
For the sake of illustration, let us focus on the anonymized
groups G1 and G2 containing the first two tuples in tables
T ∗1 and T
∗
2 in Figure 2, respectively. The probability in se-
rial publishing can be derived by the possible world analysis.
There are four possible worlds for G1 and G2 in these two
published tables, as shown in Figure 3. Here each possible
world is one possible way to assign the diseases to the indi-
viduals in such a way that is consistent with the published ta-
bles. Therefore, each possible world is a possible assignment
of the sensitive values to the individuals at all the publication
time points for groups G1 and G2. Note that an individual
can be assigned to different values at different data releases,
and the assignment in one data release is independent of the
assignment in another release.
Consider individual o2. Among the four possible worlds,
three possible worlds link o2 to “chlamydia”, namely w1, w2
and w3. In w1 and w2, the linkage occurs at T1, and in w3, the
linkage occurs at T2. Thus, the probability that o2 is linked
to “chlamydia” in at least one of the tables is equal to 3/4,
which is greater than 1/2, the intended privacy threshold.
From this example, we can see that localized guarantee does
not imply global guarantee.
In this paper, we show that in order to ensure the global
guarantee, the sizes of the anonymized groups need to be
bigger than that needed for localized guarantee. In the above
Sex Zipcode Disease
M/F 650** flu
M/F 650** chlamydia
M/F 650** flu
M/F 650** fever
Sex Zipcode Disease
M/F 650** chlamydia
M/F 650** flu
M/F 650** fever
M/F 650** flu
(a) T1∗ (b) T2∗
Figure 4: Anonymization for global guarantee
example, we can use size 4 anonymized groups as shown in
Figure 4. There will be 4! × 4! possible worlds. It is easy to
see that 3/4 of the possible worlds do not assign chlamydia to
o2 in the first release, 3/4 of them do not assign chlamydia to
o2 in the second release, and 3/4×3/4 = 9/16 of the possible
worlds do not assign chlamydia to o2 in both releases. The
remaining possible worlds assign chlamydia to o2 in at least
one of the two releases. Hence, the privacy breach probability
= 1− 9/16 = 7/16 < 1/2.
The contributions of this paper include the following: We
point out the problem of privacy breach that arises with lo-
calized guarantee and propose to study the problem of global
guarantee in privacy preserving serial data publishing. We
formally analyze the privacy breach with transient sensitive
values. Useful properties related to the anonymization un-
der the global guarantee are derived. These properties are
related to the anonymized group sizes. Typically group sizes
greater than that required for the localized guarantee will be
needed to attain the global guarantee. These properties are
then leveraged in the proposal of new anonymization strate-
gies that can minimize the information loss. We have also
conducted extensive experiments with a real medical dataset
to verify our techniques. The results show that our method-
ology are very promising in real world applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
surveys the previous related works. Section 3 contains our
problem definition. Section 4 describes a general formula for
the breach probability. Section 5 discusses some key proper-
ties for this problem. Section 6 describes our methodology for
privacy protection. Section 7 suggests a possible implemen-
tation. Section 8 is an empirical study. Section 9 concludes
our work and points out some possible future directions.
2. RELATED WORK
Here, we summarize the previous works on the problem of
privacy preserving serial data publishing. k-anonymity has
been considered in [8] and [19] for serial publication allowing
only insertions, but they do not consider the linkage probabil-
ities to sensitive values. The work in [23] considers sequential
releases for different attribute subsets for the same dataset,
which is different from our definition of serial publishing.
There are some more related works that attempt to avoid
the linkage of individuals to sensitive values. Delay publising
is proposed in [6] to avoid problems of insertions, but deletion
and updates are not considered. While [30] considers both in-
sertions and deletions, both [6] and [30] make the assumption
that when an individual appears in consecutive data releases,
then the sensitive value for that individual is not changed. As
pointed out in [5], this assumption is not realistic. Also the
protection in [30] is record-based and not individual-based.
This is quite problematic, as in our running examples, there
are two records for one individual o2, namely, t1 in table T1
and t2 in table T2 (note that T1 and T2 need not be con-
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Sex Zipcode Disease
M 65001 flu
M 65002 chlamydia
T1
Sex Zipcode Disease
M 65001 flu
M 65002 chlamydia
T2
Sex Zipcode Disease
M 65001 flu
M 65002 chlamydia
T1
Sex Zipcode Disease
M 65001 chlamydia
M 65002 flu
T2
Sex Zipcode Disease
M 65001 chlamydia
M 65002 flu
T1
Sex Zipcode Disease
M 65001 flu
M 65002 chlamydia
T2
Sex Zipcode Disease
M 65001 chlamydia
M 65002 flu
T1
Sex Zipcode Disease
M 65001 chlamydia
M 65002 flu
T2
(a) Possible world 1 w1 (b) Possible world 2 w2 (c) Possible world 3 w3 (d) Possible world 4 w4
Figure 3: Possible worlds for G1 and G2
secutive releases, so that the sensitive value linked to o2 can
change even if we adopt the above unrealistic assumption in
[6, 30]). If we consider just tuple t1, then there are only 2
possible worlds where t1 is linked to chlamydia in Figure 3,
namely w1 and w2. If we just consider tuple t2, there are
also only 2 possible worlds linking it to chlamydia, namely
w1 and w3. Hence, T
∗
1 and T
∗
2 satisfy the record-based re-
quirement of [30] if the risk threshold is 0.5. In fact, these
are possible tables generated by the mechanism proposed in
[30]. However, we have shown that this anonymization does
not provide the expected protection for the individuals.
The ℓ-scarcity model is introduced in [5] to handle the sit-
uations when some data may be permanent so that once an
individual is linked to such a value, the linkage will remain
in subsequent releases whenever the individual appears (not
limited to consecutive releases only). However, for transient
sensitive values, [30] and [5] adopt the following principle.
Principle 1 (Localized Guarantee). For each re-
lease of the data publication, the probability that an individual
is linked to a sensitive value is bounded by a threshold.
However, we have seen in the example in the previous sec-
tion that this cannot satisfy the expected privacy require-
ment. Hence, we consider the following principle.
Principle 2 (Global Guarantee). Over all the pub-
lished releases, the probability that an individual has ever been
linked to a sensitive value is bounded by a threshold.
Although the privacy guarantee is the most important data
publication criterion, the published data must also provide a
reasonable level of utility so that it can be useful for ap-
plications such as data mining or data analysis. Utility is
a tradeoff for the privacy guarantee since anonymization of
data introduces information loss. There are different defi-
nitions of utility in the existing literature. Here, we briefly
describe some common definitions.
The anonymized group sizes have been considered in utility
metrics. The average group size is considered in [16]. In [3],
the discernability model assigns a penalty to each tuple t as
determined by the square of the size of the anonymized group
for t. In [12], the normalized average anonymized group size
metric is proposed, which is given by the total number of
tuples in the table divided by the product of the total number
of anonymized groups and a value k (for k-anonymity). Here,
the best case occurs when each group has size k.
Other works [29, 31, 26] consider categorical data that
comes with a taxonomy so that the information loss is mea-
sured with respective to the structure in the taxonomy when
data are generalized from the leaf nodes to higher levels in
the taxonomy. Both [11] and [28] measure utility by compar-
ing the data distributions before and after anonymization.
Recently, [20] and [33] consider the accuracy in answering
aggregate queries to be a measure of utility.
[10, 24, 1] assume that the data is utilized for classification
and hence define the utility accordingly. The anonymization
mechanisms in [17, 2, 32] are by means of suppressing data
entries in the table, and hence information loss is measured
by the number of suppressed entries.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Suppose tables T1, T2, ..., Tk are generated at time points,
1, 2, ..., k, respectively. Each table Ti has two kinds of at-
tributes, quasi-identifier attributes and sensitive attributes.
For the sake of illustration, we consider one single sensi-
tive attribute S containing |S| values, namely s1, s2, ..., s|S|.
Assume that the sensitive values for individuals can freely
change from one release to another release so that the link-
age of an individual o to a sensitive value s in one data release
has no effect on the linkage of o to any other sensitive value
in any other data release. Assume at each time point j, a
data publisher generates an anonymized version T ∗j of Tj for
data publishing so that each record in Tj will belong to one
anonymized group G in T ∗j . Given an anonymized group G,
we define G.S to be a multi-set containing all sensitive values
in G, and G.I to be the set of individuals that appear in G.
Definition 1 (Possible World). A series of tables
TS = {T p1 , T
p
2 , ..., T
p
k } is a possible world for published ta-
bles {T ∗1 , T
∗
2 , ..., T
∗
k } if the following requirement is satisfied.
For each i ∈ [1, k],
1. there is a one-to-one corresponding between individuals
in T pi and individuals in T
∗
i
2. for each anonymized group G in T ∗i , the multi-set of the
sensitive values of the corresponding individuals in T pi
is equal to G.S.
Let p(o, s, k) be the probability that an individual o is
linked to s in at least one published table among published
tables T ∗1 , T
∗
2 , ..., T
∗
k .
Let t.S stand for the sensitive value of tuple t. We say
that o is linked to s in a table T pi if for the tuple t of o in T
p
i ,
t.S = s. Following previous works, we define the probability
based on the possible worlds as follows.
Definition 2 (Breach Probability). The breach
probability is given by
p(o, s, k) =
Wlink(o, s, k)
Wtotal,k
(1)
where Wlink(o, s, k) is the total number of possible worlds
where o is linked to s in at least one published table among
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T p1 , T
p
2 , ..., T
p
k and Wtotal,k is the total number of possible
worlds for published tables T ∗1 , T
∗
2 , ..., T
∗
k .
We will describe how we derive a general formula to calcu-
late p(o, s, k) in Section 4.
While privacy breach is the most important concern, the
utility of the published data also need to be preserved. There
are different definitions of utility in the existing literature.
Some commonly adopted utility measurements are described
in Section 2.
In this paper, we are studying the following problem.
Problem 1. Given a privacy parameter ℓ (a positive in-
teger), a utility measurement, k − 1 published tables, namely
T ∗1 , T
∗
2 , ..., T
∗
k−1 and one raw table Tk, we want to generate a
published table T ∗k from Tk such that the utility is maximized,
and for each individual o and each sensitive value s,
p(o, s, k) ≤ 1/ℓ
Note that the above problem definition follows Principle 2
for global guarantee as discussed in Section 2.
3.1 Global versus Localized Guarantee
Here, we show that protecting individual privacy with Prin-
ciple 2 (global guarantee) implies protecting individual pri-
vacy with Principle 1 (localized guarantee). Under Princi-
ple 1, let q(o, s, j, k) be the probability that an individual o is
linked to a sensitive value s in the j-th table. Following the
definition of probability adopted in most previous works [30,
5], we have
q(o, s, j, k) =
Llink(o, s, j, k)
Wtotal,k
where Llink(o, s, j, k) is the total number of possible worlds
in which o is linked to s in the j-th table and Wtotal,k is the
total number of possible worlds for the k published tables.
In our running example, k=2 and from Figure 3, there are
four possible worlds, Wtotal,k = 4. Consider published ta-
ble T ∗1 . There are two possible worlds where o2 is linked to
chlamydia (s), namely w1 and w2. Thus, Llink(o2, s, 1, k) =
2 and q(o2, s, 1, k) =
2
4
= 1
2
. Similarly, when j = 2,
q(o2, s, 2, k) =
1
2
.
In general, it is obvious thatWlink(o, s, k) ≥ Llink(o, s, j, k)
for any j ∈ [1, k]. We derive that
p(o, s, k) ≥ q(o, s, j, k)
Hence we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If p(o, s, k) ≤ 1/ℓ (under Principle 2), then for
any j ∈ [1, k], q(o, s, j, k) ≤ 1/ℓ (under Principle 1).
Corollary 1. Principle 2 (global guarantee) is a strictly
stronger requirement than Principle 1 (localized guarantee).
4. BREACH PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider how the breach probability
p(o, s, k) can be derived. For privacy breach, we focus on the
possible assignment of sensitive values to one individual at
a time. Therefore, we introduce the following possible world
definition to deal with assignments to a particular individual.
Definition 3 (AGi). At any data release, let AGi(o) be
the anonymized group that contains the record for individual
o in published table T ∗i .
For the sake of clarity, if the context is clear, we omit the
subscript and denote AGi(o) by AG(o).
Definition 4 (Possible World for o). Given a pos-
sible world TS = {T p1 , T
p
2 , ..., T
p
k } for {T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , ..., T
∗
k }. Let
us extract the tuples in each T pi that correspond to the tuples
in the anonymized group AGi(o) (containing individual o in
T ∗i ) to form table T
p
i (o). Then, the series of smaller tables,
denoted by TS(o) which is equal to {T p1 (o), T
p
2 (o), ..., T
p
k (o)},
form a possible world for AG1(o), ... AGk(o). We also say
that that TS(o) is a possible world for o for {T ∗1 , T
∗
2 , ..., T
∗
k }.
For example, Figure 3 shows all the possible worlds for G1
and G2 for o2 in the published tables shown in Figure 2(a)
and Figure 2(b). Note that in the above definition, if o does
not appear in a table Ti, then T
p
i (o) is an empty table.
4.1 Possible World Analysis
Since the sensitive values are transient and we do not as-
sume any additional knowledge about the data linkage, the
assignment of sensitive values to individuals in groups other
than AG(o) are independent of the assignment to the indi-
viduals in AG(o). Hence, we arrive at the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The value of p(o, s, k) can be derived based on
the analysis of the possible worlds for o.
The above lemma helps to greatly simplify the analysis of
the privacy breach by considering only AG(o) in each data
release. In the following, we may refer to a possible world for
o simply as a possible world.
Consider an anonymized group AG(o) in Tj for individual
o. Let nj be the size AG(o). Let nj,i be the total number
of tuples in AG(o) with sensitive value si for i = 1, 2, ..., |S|.
The total number of possible worlds for AG(o) can be derived
by combinatorial analysis.
Lemma 3 (No. of Poss. Worlds for Single Table).
The total number of possible worlds for the anonymized group
AG(o) in a single published table T ∗j is equal to
Wj =
nj !Q|S|
i=1 nj,i!
For example, consider an anonymized group of size 4 con-
taining two s1 values, one s2 value and one s3 value in T
∗
j .
Then, Wj is equal to
4!
2!×1!×1!
= 12.
4.2 Breach Probability
Recall that our objective is to compute p(o, s, k) which
involves two major components, namely Wlink(o, s, k) and
Wtotal,k. In the following, we will describe how we obtain the
values of these two components.
By Lemma 3, the total number of possible worlds for o
in the published tables T ∗1 , T
∗
2 , ..., T
∗
k , denoted by Wtotal,k, is
equal to
Wtotal,k =
kY
j=1
Wj =
kY
j=1
nj !Q|S|
i=1 nj,i!
(2)
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Next, we will describe how to obtain the formula for
Wlink(o, s, k). Without loss of generality, we consider the
privacy protection for an arbitrary sensitive value s = s1.
The following analysis applies for each sensitive value.
Note that, for any arbitrary sensitive value s1, we have the
following.
Wtotal,k =Wlink(o, s1, k) +W link(o, s1, k)
where W link(o, s1, k) is the total number of possible worlds
where o is not linked to s1 in all k published tables, namely
T p1 , T
p
2 , ..., T
p
k . Thus,
Wlink(o, s1, k) =Wtotal,k −W link(o, s1, k)
Next, we will show how we derive W link(o, s1, k). Let
θ(o, s1, j) be the total number of possible worlds for table
T pj (treated as a singleton table series) that o is not linked to
s1.
Consider a possible table T pj where o is not linked to s1.
Since o is not linked to s1 in T
p
j , o is linked to a sensitive
value sq where q 6= 1 in T
p
j . The number of possible worlds
for T pj where o is linked to sq in T
p
j is equal to
Wsq,j =
(nj − 1)!
(nj,q − 1)!
Q|S|
i=1 and i6=q
nj,i!
By considering all sensitive values sq where q ∈ [2, |S|], the
total number of possible worlds for T pj where o is not linked
to s1 (i.e., θ(o, s1, j)) is equal to
|S|X
q=2
Wsq,j =
|S|X
q=2
(nj − 1)!
(nj,q − 1)!
Q|S|
i=1 and i6=q
nj,i!
=
|S|X
q=2
(nj − 1)!nj,qQ|S|
i=1 nj,i!
=
(nj − 1)!Q|S|
i=1 nj,i!
|S|X
q=2
nj,q
Consider W link(o, s1, k)
=
kY
j=1
θ(o, s1, j)
=
kY
j=1
[
(nj − 1)!Q|S|
i=1 nj,i!
|S|X
q=2
nj,q ]
= (
kY
j=1
(nj − 1)!Q|S|
i=1 nj,i!
)(
kY
j=1
|S|X
q=2
nj,q)
= (
kY
j=1
(nj − 1)!Q|S|
i=1 nj,i!
)(
kY
j=1
(nj − nj,1))
From Equation (1),
p(o, s1, k)
=
Wlink(o, s1, k)
Wtotal,k
=
Wtotal,k −W link(o, s1, k)
Wtotal,k
=
Qk
j=1
nj !Q|S|
i=1
nj,i!
− (
Qk
j=1
(nj−1)!Q|S|
i=1
nji!
)(
Qk
j=1(nj − nj,1))
Qk
j=1
nj !Q|S|
i=1
nj,i!
=
Qk
j=1 nj −
Qk
j=1(nj − nj,1)Qk
j=1 nj
Lemma 4 (Closed Form of p(o, s1, k)).
p(o, s1, k) =
Qk
j=1 nj −
Qk
j=1(nj − nj,1)Qk
j=1 nj
(3)
From Equation (1), p(o, s1, k) is defined with a conceptual
terms with the total number of possible worlds. Lemma 4
gives a closed form of p(o, s1, k). Given the information of
nj (i.e., the size of the anonymized group in the j-th table)
and nj,1 (i.e., the number of tuples in the anonymized group
with sensitive value s1 in the j-th table), we can calculate
p(o, s1, k) with its closed form directly.
Example 1 (Two-Table Illustration). Consider
that we want to protect the linkage between an individual
and a sensitive value s1. Suppose o appears in both pub-
lished tables T ∗1 and T
∗
2 . Let AG1(o) and AG2(o) be the
anonymized groups in T ∗1 and T
∗
2 containing o. Suppose
both AG1(o) and AG2(o) are linked to s1.
By the notation adopted in this paper, nk is the size of
AGk(o) and nk,1 is the total number of tuples in AGk(o)
with sensitive value s1.
By Lemma 4, we have
p(o, s1, k) =
n1n2 − (n1 − n1,1)(n2 − n2,1)
n1n2
=
n2,1n1 + n1,1n2 − n1,1n2,1
n1n2
Example 2 (Running Example). In our running ex-
ample as shown in Figure 2, consider the second individual
o2 and a sensitive value “chlamydia”. We know that n1 =
n2 = 2. Suppose s1 is “chlamydia”. Thus, n1,1 = n2,1 = 1.
With respect to the published tables as shown in Figure 2,
according to the formula derived in Example 1,
p(o2, s1, 2) =
1× 2 + 1× 2− 1× 1
2× 2
=
3
4
which is greater than 1/2 (the desired threshold).
However, if we publish tables as shown in Figure 4, then
n1 = n2 = 4 and n1,1 = n2,1 = 1.
p(o2, s1, 2) =
1× 4 + 1× 4− 1× 1
4× 4
=
7
16
which is smaller than 1/2.
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In this example, we observe that, since the published tables
as shown in Figure 4 have a larger anonymized group size
(compared with the published tables as shown in Figure 2),
p(o2, s1, 2) is smaller.
In this paper, we aim to publish table T ∗k like Figure 4 at
each time point k such that p(o, s, k) ≤ 1/ℓ for each individual
o and each sensitive value s.
From Example 2, we observe that a larger anonymized
group size reduces the breach probability that individual o
is linked to sensitive value s1 in the past. However, the
anonymized group size alone cannot reduce the breach proba-
bility. Consider that an anonymized group in published table
T ∗k contains all sensitive values s1, instead of distinct sensi-
tive values. Even though this anonymized group is larger, if
it still contains all sensitive values s1, it is easy to verify that
an individual o in this anonymized group must be linked to
s1 in this table T
∗
k .
In fact, the breach probability is determined by the
anonymized group size ratio. The anonymized group size ra-
tio is equal to the anonymized group size divided by the to-
tal number of tuples in this anonymized group with sensitive
value s1. In Example 2, since all sensitive values are distinct
in an anonymized group (i.e., the total number of tuples in
this anonymized group with sensitive value s1 is equal to 1),
the anonymized group size ratio is equal to the anonymized
group size. In the next section, we will show that the larger
anonymized group size ratio can reduce the probability.
5. THEORETICAL PROPERTIES
In the previous section, we describe that a larger
anonymized group ratio can reduce the breach probability.
In this section, we will first study some properties of our
problem, including a minimum anonymized group ratio for
global privacy guarantee, and then a monotonicity property
that can be useful in data anonymization.
5.1 Minimum AG size Ratio
Recall that nk is the anonymized group (AG) size and nk,1
is the number of tuples in the anonymized group with sensi-
tive value s1. In the following, we will derive the minimum
anonymized group size ratio nk
nk,1
for privacy protection under
the global guarantee.
Theorem 1. Let k be an integer greater than 1. Suppose
the anonymized group in T ∗k containing individual o is linked
to s1. p(o, s1, k) ≤ 1/ℓ if and only if
nk
nk,1
≥
ℓ
Qk−1
j=1 (nj − nj,1)
ℓ
Qk−1
j=1 (nj − nj,1)− (ℓ− 1)
Qk−1
j=1 nj
(4)
Proof: By Lemma 4, p(o, s, k) is equal toQk
j=1 nj−
Qk
j=1(nj−nj,1)Q
k
j=1
nj
.
p(o, s1, k) ≤ 1/ℓ
⇔
Qk
j=1 nj −
Qk
j=1(nj − nj,1)Qk
j=1 nj
≤
1
ℓ
⇔
nk
Qk−1
j=1 nj − (nk − nk,1)
Qk−1
j=1 (nj − nj,1)
nk
Qk−1
j=1 nj
≤
1
ℓ
⇔
Qk−1
j=1 nj − (1−
nk,1
nk
)
Qk−1
j=1 (nj − nj,1)Qk−1
j=1 nj
≤
1
ℓ
⇔
nk,1
nk
≤ 1−
ℓ
Qk−1
j=1 nj −
Qk−1
j=1 nj
ℓ
Qk−1
j=1 (nj − nj,1)
⇔
nk
nk,1
≥
ℓ
Qk−1
j=1 (nj − nj,1)
ℓ
Qk−1
j=1 (nj − nj,1)− (ℓ− 1)
Qk−1
j=1 nj
From the above, for any k > 1, we can see that the value
of nk
nk,1
should be lower bounded by the value of
en(k) = ℓ
Qk−1
j=1 (nj − nj,1)
ℓ
Qk−1
j=1 (nj − nj,1)− (ℓ− 1)
Qk−1
j=1 nj
We define en(k) = ℓ when k = 1.
Example 3 (Running Example). From Example 2,
we know that the published tables shown in Figure 4 satisfy
the privacy requirement (i.e., p(o, s, k) ≤ 1/ℓ where k = 2
and ℓ = 2). At time k = 3, we want to publish a new table
T ∗3 from a raw table T3 which contain o2.
Suppose we will put o2 in the anonymized group AG3(o2)
in T ∗3 which is linked to s1 where s1 is chlamydia. By Theo-
rem 1, when k = 3, the R.H.S. of Equation (4) becomes
ℓ(n1 − n1,1)(n2 − n2,1)
ℓ(n1 − n1,1)(n2 − n2,1)− (ℓ− 1)n1n2
=
2(4− 1)(4− 1)
2(4− 1)(4− 1)− (2− 1) · 4 · 4
= 9
which is the minimum anonymized group size ratio n3
n3,1
in
the published table T ∗3 . Suppose AG3(o) contains only one
occurrence of s1. Then, the size of the anonymized group
AG3(o) should be at least 9 so that p(o, s1, 3) ≤ 1/2.
We have the following corollary when the inequality in The-
orem 1 becomes an equality.
Corollary 2. nk
nk,1
= en(k) if and only if p(o, s1, k) = 1/ℓ.
When a record for individual o appears in a data release Ti
and in the published data T ∗i , the anonymized group contain-
ing o has no relation to sensitive value s, then intuitively, this
release should not have any impact on the privacy protection
of o linking to s. This is formally stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. If the anonymized group in T ∗k containing o is
not linked to s1, then p(o, s1, k) = p(o, s1, k − 1).
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Proof: Since the anonymized group in T ∗k containing o is not
linked to s1, we know that o is linked to s1 in one of the first
(k − 1)-th published tables. Thus,
Wlink(o, s1, k) =Wk ×Wlink(o, s1, k − 1)
Thus, we have
p(o, s, k) =
Wlink(o, s1, k)
Wtotal,k
=
Wk ×Wlink(o, s1, k − 1)Qk
j=1Wj
(From Equation (2))
=
Wlink(o, s1, k − 1)
Wtotal,k−1
= p(o, s, k − 1)
Thus, nk
nk,1
can be equal to any real number and does not
affect the value of p(o, s, k) in this case.
Suppose a published table T ∗k contains o and we need to
generate an anonymized group G containing o. Note that the
size of the anonymized groupG is nk and the number of tuples
in G with sensitive value si is equal to nk,i for i = [1, |S|].
Without loss of generality, suppose we want to protect the
privacy linkage between an individual o and a sensitive value
s1. From Theorem 1 and Lemma 5, we can determine the
minimum value of nk
nk,1
for generating an anonymized group
G. From Theorem 1, if G contains s1, in order to guarantee
p(o, s1, k) ≤ 1/ℓ, we have to set the value of nk to satisfy
nk
nk,1
≥ en(k)
From Lemma 5, if G does not contain s1, any value of
nk
nk,1
will not affect the privacy related to o and s1.
Although Theorem 1 suggests that if we set the value of
nk
nk,1
at least en(k), then p(o, s1, k) ≤ 1/ℓ. However, suppose
we set this value exactly equal to en(k), although we can guar-
antee p(o, s1, k) ≤ 1/ℓ for the k published tables, there will
a privacy breach (i.e., p(o, s1, k
′) > 1/ℓ) for any additional
future published tables in which an anonymized group con-
taining o is linked to s1. This is a result of the following
lemma.
Theorem 2. Consider that we published k−1 tables where
an anonymized group in T ∗k−1 containing o is linked to s1.
Suppose we are to publish T ∗k where an anonymized group in
T ∗k containing o is also linked to s1. If
nk−1
nk−1,1
= en(k − 1),
then p(o, s1, k) > 1/ℓ.
5.2 Monotonicity
Monotonicity is a useful property for some anonymization
process where the resulting anonymization groups are con-
structed in a bottom-up manner, merging smaller groups that
violates the privacy requirement into bigger groups which
may guarantee privacy. It is also useful when the anonymiza-
tion is top-down, splitting bigger groups into smaller ones as
long as the privacy guarantee holds.
Consider the privacy protection for the linkage of an indi-
vidual o to a sensitive value s1. From Lemma 5, we know
that p(o, s1, k) is independent of data releases in which any
anonymized group containing o (in the published tables) are
not linked to s1. Hence, in the following, we consider the
worst-case scenario where in all releases whenever there ex-
ists an anonymized group containing o (in a published table),
o is linked to s1.
The monotonicity property is described as follows.
Theorem 3 (Monotonicity). p(o, s1, k) is strictly de-
creasing when nk
nk,1
increases.
The proof is given in the appendix. Note that nk/nk,1
is essentially the inverse of the proportion of s1 tuples in
the anonymized group. Therefore, when a bigger group that
satisfies the privacy requirement is split into smaller ones, if
the proportion of s1 tuples in the small group containing o is
not increased, then p(o, s1, k) is not increased. Conversely if
a small group violates the privacy guarantee, merging it with
another group may decrease the proportion of s1 tuples and
thus p(o, s, k) may be decreased.
An anonymized group AG is said to violate the global guar-
antee if there exists an individual o ∈ AG.I and a sensitive
value s ∈ AG.S such that p(o, s, k) > 1/ℓ.
Corollary 3. Consider an anonymized group AG in the
published table T ∗k which violates the global guarantee. If we
partition AG into a number of smaller groups, one of the
smaller groups violates the global guarantee.
Proof Sketch: Suppose nk/nk,1 is the size ratio for AG. It
is easy to see that one of the smaller groups has the size ra-
tio smaller than nk/nk,1. By Theorem 3, p(o, s, k) increases.
Since AG violates the global guarantee (i.e., p(o, s, k) > 1/ℓ),
the smaller group also violates the global guarantee (i.e.,
p(o, s, k) > 1/ℓ).
6. ANONYMIZATION
In previous sections, we have observed that, by choosing a
proper size of an anonymized group, the global privacy guar-
antee can be achieved. In general, a size above a certain
threshold size can be chosen. However, setting a size equal
to the threshold size will make future anonymization infeasi-
ble (see Theorem 2). Therefore, it is necessary to choose a
size that is greater than the threshold. The increase in size
however, would lead to a decrease in the utility of the data.
Hence, a question will be how to pick a smallest size that can
maintain the global guarantee.
In this section, we show that if we are given a bound on the
number of releases where an individual o may be linked to a
sensitive value s, then we can devise a strategy to minimize
the maximum anonymization group size. We also propose
another strategy which aims to reduce the anonymized group
size on average.
6.1 Constant-Ratio Strategy
In database related problems, one can typically derive ef-
fective mechanisms based on the characteristics of the data it-
self. In our problem scenario, a data publisher has at his/her
disposal the statistical information of the data collections.
For example, consider the medical database. The statistics
can point to the expected frequency of an individual con-
tracting a certain disease over his or her lifespan. With such
information, one can set an estimated bound on the num-
ber of data releases that a person may indeed be linked to
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ℓ 2 2 2 5 10 2 5 10
k
′ 2 5 20 20 20 10 10 10
enc 3.44 7.75 29.41 90.13 190.33 15.10 45.35 95.42
Table 1: Values of enc with selected values of l and k′
the disease. With this knowledge, one can adopt a constant-
ratio strategy which we shall show readily can minimize the
maximum size of the corresponding anonymized groups.
Constant-ratio strategy makes sure that the size of
anonymized groups AG(o) for individual o containing s1 di-
vided by the number of occurrences of s1 remain unchanged
over a number of data releases. Formally, given an integer k′
for the number of data releases, for i ∈ [1, k′],
noi
noi,1
= enc
where enc is a positive real number constant, and oi is a times-
tamp for the i-th release where both o and s1 appear. For
the sake of simplicity, we set enc = nns where n and ns are
positive integer constants where ns ≤ n.
k′ corresponds to the total number of possible releases in
the future. In other words, during data publishing, the data
publisher expects to publish k′ table for this data. With this
given parameter k′, we can calculate n and ns such that
noi
noi,1
remain unchanged when i changes.
In order to make sure that p(o, s1, j) ≤ 1/ℓ for any j ∈
[1, k′], we need to protect p(o, s1, k
′) ≤ 1/ℓ. In the following,
we consider p(o, s1, k
′) which is equal to
Qk′
j=1 nj −
Qk′
j=1(nj − nj,1)Qk′
j=1 nj
≤
1
ℓ
nk
′
− (n− ns)
k′ ≤ nk
′
×
1
ℓ
1− (1−
ns
n
)k
′
≤
1
ℓ
ns
n
≤ 1− (1−
1
ℓ
)1/k
′
n
ns
≥ 1/[1− (1−
1
ℓ
)1/k
′
]
Let enc = 1/[1− (1− 1ℓ )1/k′ ].
Table 1 shows the values of enc with selected values of ℓ
and k′. When ℓ increases, enc increases. When k′ increases,enc also increases.
It remains to show that the constant-ratio strategy indeed
can lead to data publishing that minimizes the maximum
anonymized group sizes. First, we define this property more
formally.
Definition 5 (Min-Max optimization). An
anonymization for serial data publishing is min-max
optimal if the maximum anonymized group size among the
anonymized groups containing individual o and sensitive
value s1 for any given o and s1 over all data releases is
minimized.
Theorem 4 (Optimality). The constant-ratio strategy
generates a min-max optimal solution for serial data publish-
ing.
Proof: Let N be the set of anonymized group sizes in the
k′ published tables where these anonymized groupes contain
o and are linked to s1. That is, N = {n1, n2, ..., nk′}. Let
u(N) = maxni∈N ni. Let Na be the set of anonymized group
sizes in the k′ published tables generated by strategy a.
Let p(o, s1, k
′|a) be p(o, s1, k
′) with respect to strategy a.
Let A be the set of all possible strategies a such that, with the
published tables with strategy a, p(o, s1, k
′|a) ≤ 1/ℓ. Sup-
pose ao is the constant-ratio strategy. We will prove that
this strategy can obtain an optimal value of u(N). That is,
u(Nao) = min
a∈A
{u(Na)}
We prove by contradiction. Consider that the strategy ao
generates Nao = {n1, n2, ..., nk′}. By Corollary 2, it is easy
to verify that p(o, s1, k
′|ao) = 1/ℓ.
Suppose there exists a strategy a′ 6= ao which gener-
ates Na′ = {n
′
1, n
′
2, ..., n
′
k′} such that u(Na′) < u(Nao) and
p(o, s1, k
′|a′) ≤ 1/ℓ. We deduce that, for all i ∈ [1, k′],
n′i < ni
By Theorem 2, we know that, p(o, s1, k
′|a′) > p(o, s1, k
′|ao)
(which is equal to 1/ℓ). We conclude that p(o, s1, k
′|a′) > 1/ℓ.
Thus, privacy breach occurs, which leads to a contradiction.
Although the constant-ratio strategy generates a min-max
optimal solution, the statistical information about the data
should be known. For example, the constant-ratio strategy
requires the priori knowledge about k′ which is equal to the
total number of possible releases in the future. If such in-
formation is unavailable, we can use the geometric strategy
proposed in the next subsection where this strategy does not
require the statistical information.
6.2 Geometric Strategy
Other than minimizing the maximum anonymized group
size, another desirable utility criterion will be to minimize
the average group size. In order to achieve this goal, we
examine the probability of occurrences of anonymized groups
for linking individuals o to a certain sensitive value s. From
past data, there will be a distribution of the total number
of releases where any given individual has contracted disease
s. For example, if the maximum of such value is 10, some
individuals may be linked to s 10 times in total, but most
individuals may be linked to s less than 10 times in total.
Typically, the number of individuals that are linked to s for
at least k releases will be greater than that for k′′ releases
where k < k′′. Therefore, when choosing the sizes of the
anonymized groups, it will reduce the average group size if we
choose smaller sizes for the earlier releases where o is linked
to s and bigger sizes for the later such releases. This is the
essence of our next proposed strategy, namely, the geometric
strategy.
With the geometric strategy, the anonymized group size
will be equal to the minimum feasible value of en(k) multiplied
by a factor, α, at any time point k. This will be a growing
value since the value of en will grow with k. Note that α must
be greater than 1 since with α = 1, the minimum feasible
en(k) will be used, and from Theorem 2, that will make fu-
ture selection of group size infeasible. The value of α can be
selected based on the estimated number of releases where an
individual will be linked to s in total.
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Figure 5: Effect of α and l on ratio nk/nk,1
Thus, with this strategy, with j ≥ 1, we set
nj
nj,1
= α · en(j)
Figure 5 shows how the values of nk
nk,1
increases with k.
Figure 5(a) studies the effect of α (with ℓ set to 2) and Fig-
ure 5(b) studies the effect of ℓ (with α set to 5). When k
increases, nk
nk,1
increases. When α is larger, although the ini-
tial value of nk
nk,1
is larger, the grow rate of nk
nk,1
is smaller.
When ℓ increases, nk
nk,1
increases. Figure 5(a) shows that
α = 5 and 10 are better choices than α = 3 since the increase
in the ratio is much slower. Note that these values are all
pre-computable and it is easy to choose a suitable parameter
by examining the pre-computed trends.
6.3 Discussion
In both of the above strategies, there may occur rare occa-
sions where the required anonymized group size is not avail-
able in the given data set. As with previous works [30, 5],
we handle the exceptional cases by data distortion. We can
suppress the sensitive values of individuals when it is found
that no feasible group size can maintain the global guarantee
for privacy preservation. From our experimental results, such
suppression has not been found needed.
Though our discussion has been based on a single value for
the sensitive attribute in each record, our results can be easily
extended to the case where each record may contain a set of
values for the sensitive attribute. The essential proportion of
possible worlds where an individual is linked to a sensitive
value would not be affected.
7. IMPLEMENTATION
In Section 6, we describe two strategies to determine the
value of nk
nk,1
for privacy protection with respect to a sensitive
value s1. In the following, we describe how to anonymize the
table given the desired value of nk
nk,1
.
Since the formula is based on the frequency that a tuple for
individual o is linked to a sensitive value s in an anonymized
group from published tables (by Theorem 1 and Lemma 5),
we propose to keep a data structure, called statistics file, to
store the sizes of the anonymized groups containing a record
for individual o such that o is linked to a sensitive value s,
denoted by m(o, s). Consider an individual o and a sensitive
value s. Let the anonymized groups containing o in T ∗1 , T
∗
2
and T ∗3 be G1 (of size 3), G2 (of size 5) and G3 (of size 4),
respectively. If G1 and G2 contain s but G3 does not, m(o, s)
is equal to {3, 5}. Suppose there is another published table
T ∗4 which does not contain o. m(o, s) is also equal to {3, 5}.
Given the statistics file, it is possible to adopt exist-
ing known anonymization methods to generate anonymized
groups that satisfy the group size ratio requirement of inter-
est. For example, we may use a bottom-up approach to grow
the anonymized groups. Alternatively, we can use a top-down
approach to keep breaking up large anonymized groups and
stops when it begins to violate the group size ratio require-
ment.
8. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
All of our experiments have been performed on a Linux
workstation with a 3.2Ghz CPU and 2 Giga-byte memory.
Similar to [5], we deploy one public available real hospital
database CADRMP1. In the database, there are 8 tables: Re-
ports, Reactions, Drugs, ReportDrug, Ingredients, Outcome,
and Druginvolve. Reports consists of some patients’ basic
personal information. Therefore, we take it as the voter reg-
istration list. Reactions has a foreign key PID referring to the
attribute ID in Reports and another attribute to indicate the
person’s disease. After removing tuples with missing values,
Reactions has 105,420 tuples while Reports contains 40,478
different individuals. We take 10% least frequent sensitive
values as transient sensitive values. There are totally 232
transient sensitive values.
Dynamic microdata table series TSexp={T1, T2, ..., T20} is
created from Reactions. We divide Reactions into 20 parti-
tions of the same size, namely P1, P2, ..., P20. T1 is set to P1.
For each i ∈ [2, 20], we generate Ti as follows. Ti is set to Pi
initially. Then, we randomly select 20% of tuples in Ti−1 and
insert them into Ti. Then, in the resulting Ti, we randomly
select 20% of tuples and change their values in the sensitive
attribute according to the sensitive value distribution of all
tuples in Reaction as follows. For each selected tuple t in
the above step, we randomly pick a tuple t′ in the original
data Reactions and set the sensitive value of t in Ti to be the
sensitive value of t′ obtained in Reaction.
For our experiments, we have chosen a bottom-up
anonymization algorithm [25] with a variation of involving
the individuals that are present in the registration voter list
but absent in the data release. Such individuals can be vir-
tually included in an anonymized group and help to dilute
the linkage probability of individuals to sensitive values in
the group [18, 5]. This variation helps to improve the utility
since a group can now consist of fewer records that are ac-
tually present in the data. A bottom-up approach is chosen
because we find that typically the anonymized groups can be
easily formed based on the smallest group sizes that satisfy
the required group size ratios. In the constant-ratio strat-
egy, the default value of k′ is equal to 20. In the geometric
strategy, the default value of α is set to 2.
We have tested our proposed method in terms of effec-
tiveness and efficiency. For the evaluation of our method,
we examine four different aspects: the average size of the
anonymized groups in the published tables, the greatest size
of the anonymized groups in the published tables, the utility
of the published tables and the computation overheads.
For measuring the utility of the published data we compare
query processing results on each anonymized table T ∗j and its
corresponding microdata table Tj at each publishing round.
We follow the literature conventions [28, 30, 26, 5] to measure
1
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/medeff/databasdon/index e.html
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Figure 6: Effect of l (Constant-Ratio Strategy) where k′ = 3
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Figure 7: Effect of l (Geometric Strategy) where α = 3
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Figure 8: Effect of k′ (Constant-Ratio Strategy) where ℓ = 2
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Figure 9: Effect of α (Geometric Strategy) where ℓ = 2
10
the error by the relative error ratio in answering an aggregate
query. All the published tables are evaluated one by one.
For each evaluation, we perform 5,000 randomly generated
range queries which follows the methodology in [30] on the
microdata snapshot and its anonymized version, and then
report the average relative error ratio.
We study the effect of variations in (1) the number of
rounds, (2) the privacy requirement ℓ, (3) the parameter k′
used in the constant-ratio strategy and (4) the parameter α
used in the geometric strategy.
Effect of ℓ: Figure 6(a) shows that the average relative er-
ror of the constant-ratio strategy remains nearly unchanged
when the number of rounds (or table releases) increases. As
expected the error is larger with larger values of ℓ. In Fig-
ures 6(b) and (c), both the average anonymized group size
and the maximum anonymized group size of the constant-
ratio strategy keep nearly unchanged when we vary the num-
ber of rounds. Again as expected, the sizes increase with ℓ.
Figure 6(d) shows that the execution time of the constant-
ratio strategy keeps unchanged when there are more rounds.
In the figure, when ℓ is larger, the execution time is larger.
This is because we have to generate a larger anonymized
group.
Figure 7 shows similar results for the geometric strategy
with variation on the number of rounds. From Figures 7(a),
(b) and (c) show that the error, the average anonymized
group and the maximum anonymized group remains nearly
unchanged when the number of rounds increases. In Fig-
ure 7(d), we cannot see a consistent trend when we vary ℓ.
The execution time when ℓ = 3 is the smallest. However, the
execution time when ℓ = 7 is smaller than that when ℓ = 5.
The execution time of the algorithm depends on two factors,
namely the number of anonymized groups in the released ta-
bles and the sizes of the anonymized groups. Generating
anonymized groups with larger sizes will increase the execu-
tion time. On the other hand, generating fewer anonymized
groups will reduce the execution time. When k′ = 7, since
the factor of the total number of anonymized groups (i.e.,
fewer anonymized groups) outweighs the factor of the size of
the anonymized group (i.e., larger anonymized group size),
the execution time is smaller (compared with the case when
ℓ = 5).
Effect of k′: We study the input parameter of k′ used in the
constant-ratio strategy. In Figure 8, the average relative er-
ror, the average anonymized group size, the maximum group
size and the execution time remains nearly unchanged when
the number of rounds increases. The average relative error,
the average anonymized group size and the maximum group
size increases when k′ increases as shown in Figures 8(a),
(b) and (c). In Figure 8(d), we cannot observe a consistent
trend of the execution time when k′ increases. The reason is
similar.
Effect of α: We also study the input parameter α for the ge-
ometric strategy. Similarly, Figure 9 shows that the number
of rounds does not have a significant impact on the average
relative error, the average anonymized group size, the maxi-
mum anonymized size and the execution time. Figures 9(a),
(b) and (c) show that, when α increases, the average relative
error, the average anonymized group size and the maximum
anonymized size increases. There is no consistent trend for
the execution time when we vary α as shown in Figures 9(d).
The reasons are similar to that in the study with the effect
of ℓ.
Overall, our proposed methods are very efficient and intro-
duce very small querying error. It shows that our method can
provide the global guarantee on individual privacy as well as
maintain high utility in the published data.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new criterion of global guarantee
for privacy preserving data publishing. This guarantee cor-
responds to a basic requirement of individual privacy where
the probability of linking an individual to a sensitive value in
one or more data releases is bounded. We show that global
guarantee is a stronger privacy requirement than localized
guarantee which has been adopted in previous works. We
derive some theoretical results on this problem and discover
that the anonymized group size is an important factor in pri-
vacy protection. According to the anonymized group sizes,
we propose two strategies for anonymization. Our empiri-
cal study shows that these techniques are highly feasible and
generate data publication of high utility.
There are some promising future directions. In this pa-
per, we study the global guarantee for transient sensitive
values, meaning that the values can change freely. As a
future plan, we will study the global guarantee when both
transient sensitive values and permanent sensitive values are
present. Permanent sensitive values are studied in [5] and
refer to values that will be permanently linked to an individ-
ual once it is linked to that individual. Intuitively, we can
combine the technique here and that in [5] by forming the
HD-compositions for holders and decoys, as well as forming
anonymized groups based on the proper group size deter-
mined by our strategies here for taking care of the transient
values. However, the details are left for future studies. An-
other direction is to extend the problem with the considera-
tion of other background knowledge.
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11. APPENDIX
Here we give the proofs of some of the lemmas and theo-
rems listed in the previous sections.
Theorem 2: Consider that we published k − 1 tables where
an equivalence class in T ∗k−1 containing t is linked to s1. Sup-
pose we are to publish T ∗k where an equivalence class in T
∗
k
containing o is also linked to s1. If
nk−1
nk−1,1
= en(k − 1), then
p(o, s1, k) > 1/ℓ.
Proof:
nk−1
nk−1,1
= en(k − 1)
=
ℓ
Qk−2
j=1 (nj − nj,1)
ℓ
Qk−2
j=1 (nj − nj,1)− (ℓ− 1)
Qk−2
j=1 nj
=
ℓ
Qk−1
j=1 (1−
nj,1
nj
)
ℓ
Qk−2
j=1 (1−
nj,1
nj
)− (ℓ− 1)
Let P =
Qk−1
j=1 (1−
nj,1
nj
). We have
nk−1
nk−1,1
=
ℓP
ℓP − ℓ+ 1
Consider
p(o, s1, k)
=
Qk
j=1 nj −
Qk
j=1(nj − nj,1)Qk
j=1 nj
= 1−
kY
j=1
(1−
nj,1
nj
)
= 1− (1−
nk,1
nk
)(1−
nk−1,1
nk−1
)
k−2Y
j=1
(1−
nj,1
nj
)
= 1− (1−
nk,1
nk
)(1−
ℓP
ℓP − ℓ+ 1
)P
= 1− (1−
nk,1
nk
)(1−
1
ℓ
)
=
1
ℓ
+
nk,1
nk
(1−
1
ℓ
)
>
1
ℓ
That is, p(o, s1, k) > 1/ℓ.
Theorem 3 (MONOTONICITY). p(o, s1, k) is strictly de-
creasing when nk
nk,1
increases.
Proof:
p(o, s1, k) =
Qk
j=1 nj −
Qk
j=1(nj − nj,1)Qk
j=1 nj
= 1−
kY
j=1
(1−
nj,1
nj
)
= 1− (1−
nk,1
nk
)
k−1Y
j=1
(1−
nj,1
nj
)
If nk
nk,1
increases, the above equation decreases.
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